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1. Tahman Bradley, Rigel Anderson & Arnab Datta, Obama’s Grandmother’s Absentee
Ballot Will Be Counted by State of Hawaii, ABC NEWS, Nov. 3, 2008, http://blogs.abcnews.com/
politicalradar/2008/11/obamas-grandm-1.html.
2. Id.
3. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/19-11 (2003).
4. See Martin H. Belsky, Bush v. Gore—A Critique of Critiques, 37 TULSA L. REV. 45, 48-
60 (2001) (cataloging the judicial proceedings challenging the Florida election results).
5. Id. at 69-70; Philip J. Peisch, Note, Procurement at the Polls: How Sharing
Responsibility for Acquiring Voting Machines Can Improve and Restore Confidence in
American Voting Systems, 97 GEO. L.J. 877, 886-87 (2009) (discussing low public confidence
in American voting systems).
6. See Belsky, supra note 4, at 68-78.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545 (2006).
INTRODUCTION
On November 4, 2008, Americans watched the networks declare
Barack Obama the next President of the United States. As the
historical election came to an end, some may have turned their
thoughts to Madelyn Dunham, the President-elect’s grandmother,
who lost her battle with cancer just the day before at the age of
eighty-six. Though she did not live to see her grandson elected to the
highest office in the country, Ms. Dunham played a part in putting
him there—she voted absentee.1
Because her ballot had been legally cast and received, Hawaii
Chief Elections Officer Kevin Cronin assured reporters that it
would be counted along with the rest of the state’s votes in deter-
mining which presidential candidate would receive Hawaii’s four
electoral votes.2 Notably, if Dunham resided in her grandson’s home
state of Illinois, her ballot would have been rejected.3
Since the 2000 presidential election and the storm of litigation
that it produced,4 the American public has exhibited heightened
concern about the integrity of the voting process.5 The media
debated the implications of hanging, dimpled, and pregnant chads
on Florida ballots, and the certification of the Florida returns—
leading to the election of President George W. Bush—did not silence
the controversy.6 Despite the passage of the Help America Vote Act
of 2002 (HAVA),7 during the 2004 election news stories swirled
about the thousands of deceased whose names had yet to be purged
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8. Geoff Dougherty, Dead Voters on Rolls, Other Glitches Found in 6 Key States, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 4, 2004, at C13.
9. Darryl Fears, DNC To Investigate Ohio Voting Irregularities, WASH. POST, Dec. 7,
2004, at A10.
10. As used in this Note, absentee voting entails mail-in ballots submitted by voters who
will not be present in the district during the election period or satisfy some other criteria
permitting them to vote in this way. Advance or early voting describes votes cast at a polling
place prior to the designated election day. In more general contexts, however, these terms are
occasionally used interchangeably.
11. See CNNPolitics.com, Early Voting Suggests 2008 May See Record Turnout, Expert
Says (Oct. 22, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/10/21/early.voting/; Michael
McDonald, (Nearly) Final 2008 Early Voting Statistics, U.S.ELECTION PROJECT, Jan. 11, 2009,
http://elections.gmu.edu/Early_Voting_2008_Final.html.
12. For example, this Note will not attempt to address equal protection as it applies to
voters at the polls on election day. It does not purport to be an authoritative source on election
technology or a state’s obligations under HAVA. Furthermore, it will not consider the
constitutional issues surrounding the highly controversial voter identification laws enacted
by many states.
from the voter rolls8 and, in other districts, votes being cast by
deceased voters.9 Although outright fraud—such as a person
assuming the identity of a deceased person in order to vote more
than once or in various locations—is clearly illegal, there is another
class of votes whose legitimacy is less clearly defined: absentee and
advanced voting ballots cast by those who passed away before
election day.10
Millions of Americans cast their votes prior to election day in the
2008 election in an unprecedented mail-in and in-person early
voting turnout.11 Due to the overwhelming prevalence of absentee
voting and the importance of improving an already skeptical
electorate’s faith in the system, the government should promote
certainty in absentee voting. There are volumes of legal scholarship
on election law and voting rights. Accordingly, there are a number
of topics that are beyond the scope of this Note.12 This Note seeks to
answer three interrelated questions: (1) whether the federal
government could mandate a uniform approach to nonfraudulent
“ghost-voting”; (2) whether the federal government should adopt
such a standard; and (3) if so, what that standard should be.
Thus, Part I of this Note evaluates the dual grants of control over
the election process, divided between the states and the federal
government, and concludes that the constitutionality of federal
election regulation is well-settled. Part II weighs the arguments in
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13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
14. Id.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. Although the Seventeenth Amendment vested the power
of selecting senators with the people rather than the states, U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, it
did not “explicitly” alter Congress’s authority under this clause. KENNETH R. THOMAS,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY TO STANDARDIZE NATIONAL
ELECTION PROCEDURES 3 (2000), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/
permalink/meta-crs-1159.
favor of and against congressional intervention in the area,
assessing the chance of success of an equal protection claim brought
by the survivor of a deceased person whose vote was rejected.
Although the analysis ultimately indicates that an equal protec-
tion claim brought on behalf of a disenfranchised voter might not
have a strong chance of success, Part III considers whether voters’
distrust of the electoral system provides independent reasons
warranting federal action establishing guidelines for the states’
treatment of these votes. Finally, Part IV provides a recommenda-
tion that, though Congress is unlikely to exercise its preemptive
authority in this area of election administration, a uniform national
standard to deal with these votes would further the governmental
interest in burgeoning voters’ faith that, when they vote, their
voices will be heard.
I. FEDERALISM AND CONGRESSIONAL PREEMPTION OF ELECTION
LAWS
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof.13
The Constitution delegates the authority to regulate elections to
the states.14 This power, coupled with the Tenth Amendment right
of the states to retain “[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution,” creates a presumption of legitimacy
regarding the states’ regulation of elections.15 But this authority is
not absolute. The Constitution reserves to Congress the ability to “at
any time by law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the
Places of chusing Senators.”16 Therefore, Congress has a “general
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17. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 387 (1879).
18. See generally ROBERT K. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A
SWORD 35-40 (1947).
19. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV.
20. Everette Swinney, Enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, 1870-1877, 28 J. S. LEGAL
HIST. 202, 202 (1962).
21. Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, 140.
22. Swinney, supra note 20, at 202-03.
23. Ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433, 433-40.
24. Id. § 2. The final act in the trilogy, the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17
Stat. 13, 13-15, criminalized conspiracy to prevent citizens from voting and “reserved to the
federal courts” “exclusive original jurisdiction in all suffrage cases.” Swinney, supra note 20,
at 203.
25. See Barry H. Weinberg & Lyn Utrecht, Problems in America’s Polling Places: How
They Can Be Stopped, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 401, 404-05 (2002).
26. Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2006)).
27. Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2006)).
28. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2006)).
supervisory power over the whole subject” and may insert itself into
the administration of elections when it deems it necessary to do so.17
Congress began to regulate certain state election procedures in
the 1860s and 70s.18 The passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments guaranteed voting rights to a new class of
voters19 but could not unilaterally erase the prejudices that were at
the core of disenfranchisement. To ensure that African Americans
were able to exercise their newly guaranteed rights, Congress
passed a series of enforcement acts.20 The Enforcement Act of May
31, 187021 prohibited state officials from “discriminat[ing] among
voters on the basis of race or color in the application of local elec-
tion laws” and outlawed interference with the right to vote through
force or intimidation.22 The Force Act of February 28, 1871 further
expanded federal control over the election process.23 Intended to
curb voter fraud and false registration, the Act allowed federal
election supervisors, at the request of two or more citizens in a town
of at least 20,000 residents, to observe the registration and election
process.24
Nearly ninety years later, Congress again adopted regulations for
election procedures in response to state practices that continued to
disenfranchise African American voters.25 After the passage of the
Civil Rights Acts of 1957,26 1960,27 and 1964,28 the courts were
forced to intervene when the states crafted discriminatory policies
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29. Weinberg & Utrecht, supra note 25, at 406.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973 aa-
6 (2006)).
33. See Weinberg & Utrecht, supra note 25, at 406-07.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006).
35. Id. § 1973b.
36. Id. § 1973f.
37. Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg to
1973gg-10 (2006)).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(b) (2006).
39. Id. § 1973gg-2. States that do not require voters to register or that allow voters to
register at the polls on election day are exempt from these regulations. Id.
as a rebellion against the perceived federal encroachment.29 Finding
this “case-by-case litigation ... inadequate to combat widespread and
persistent discrimination in voting,”30 Congress instead “cut through
the protective barrier of federalism”31 by enacting the Voting Rights
Act of 1965.32 Sections 4, 5, and 8 of the Act established broad
powers for the federal government.33 Perhaps the greatest expansion
of federal authority over voting administration was embodied in
section 5, which provides for federal review of any change in “voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure” by the states.34 Section 4 of the Act also prohibits the use
of “tests or devices in determining eligibility to vote.”35 Finally,
section 8 allows the federal assignment of observers at the polls
upon a court order or at the request of the Attorney General.36
Congress has not limited its involvement in election supervision
solely to legislation implementing the achievements of the 1960s
civil rights movement. In 1993, the legislature adopted the National
Voter Registration Act (NVR or Motor Voter Act).37 Among its
purported purposes are “establish[ing] procedures that will increase
the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for
Federal office; ... protect[ing] the integrity of the electoral process;
and ... ensur[ing] that accurate and current voter registration rolls
are maintained.”38 To accomplish these goals, the statute requires
the states to offer voter registration to residents when obtaining a
driver’s license, as well as at other designated locations.39
A number of states have litigated the constitutionality of the
Motor Voter Act, contending that contemporary Supreme Court
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40. Jonathan E. Davis, Comment, The National Voter Registration Act of 1993: Debunking
States’ Rights Resistance and the Pretense of Voter Fraud, 6 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
117, 119-20 & n.23 (1997) (citing cases in which the Court has limited congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause).
41. Id. at 134.
42. Id. at 120 (citations omitted). 
43. Ass’n of Cmty. Org. for Reform Now v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 1995).
44. Id. at 796.
45. See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366-68 (1932); Voting Rights Coal. v. Wilson, 60
F.3d 1411, 1413-16 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Manning, 215 F. Supp. 272, 277, 283-84
(W.D. La. 1979).
46. But see, e.g., Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2)(A)-(4) (2006);
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13925 (2006)).
47. Richard Simon, Congress Overstepping on State Turf, Some Say, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24,
2005, at A36.
48. See Denise C. Morgan & Rebecca E. Zeitlow, The New Parity Debate: Congress and
Rights of Belonging, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1347, 1350-66 (2005).
49. Compare Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112-15 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring), with
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985).
decisions advocate federal restraint in preempting state authority.40
Yet to mount a successful challenge to Congress’s intervention in
election procedures, a proponent of states’ rights would have to
prove “consequences of the Act that impose an undue burden on
state sovereignty.”41 No such challenge has convinced the courts to
discredit the statute’s constitutionality.42 In fact, the Seventh
Circuit reasoned that Article I “requires the states to create and
operate such a system,” while at the same time it “authorizes
Congress to alter the state’s system.”43 Furthermore, the court
determined that the burden the NVR imposes was insufficient to
warrant an order of relief on constitutional grounds.44 Therefore,
Congress’s authority to involve itself in the election process is broad
and well-established.45
Many in Congress claim to prefer to avoid interfering in tradi-
tional areas of state authority.46 Nevertheless, some have observed
a legislative trend of federal preemption of state law.47 Although the
Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, somewhat curbed the expansion of federal regulation in
deference to state authority,48 federal election regulation clearly is
within the purview of the federal government and should not invite
the more stringent scrutiny applied to statutes that infringe upon
fundamental state functions.49 Still, Congress might be hesitant to
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50. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
51. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XV, XVII, XIX, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI.
52. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964); see Robert A. Sedler, The Settled Nature
of American Constitutional Law, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 173, 268 (2002); Jeffrey A. Blomberg,
Note, Protecting the Right Not To Vote from Voter Purge Statutes, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1015,
1015 (1995); see also United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385, 387-90 (1944); United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314-20 (1941); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 388 (1915); Guinn
v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 361-66 (1915); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 666-67
(1884); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 385-88 (1879).
53. Mosley, 238 U.S. at 386.
54. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
55. Gabrielle B. Ruda, Comment, Picture Perfect: A Critical Analysis of the Debate on the
2002 Help America Vote Act, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 235, 238-39 (2003). Because of the
fundamental nature of this right, strict scrutiny attaches when disparate treatment of voters
exercise its authority in the administration of qualifying absentee
ballots unless there is a compelling reason for such legislation.
Those reasons are considered in Part II.
II. THE PROBLEM DEFINED
A. The Fundamental Nature of the Right To Vote
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having
a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which,
as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic,
are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.50
The Framers of the Constitution—and of its subsequent
Amendments—clearly valued the right of citizens to vote, enacting
a number of safeguards to protect their right to be heard.51 An
abundance of Supreme Court precedent exists to shield voting rights
from abuse and to ensure such rights are extended to “all qualified
citizens.”52 Not only are citizens guaranteed the opportunity to cast
a ballot on election day, but each is promised that her vote will be
counted.53 Her voice in selecting her representative is considered
equal to all others,54 and, in casting her vote, she is claiming a piece
of her government’s accomplishments, regardless of who ultimately
takes office.
Due to its place at the heart of American democracy, traditional
jurisprudence dictates that any restriction on the fundamental
right to vote is subject to strict scrutiny review.55 In certain
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lacks a “compelling state interest,” regardless of whether the restriction specifically affects
a suspect class. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336-37 (1972).
56. Kelly T. Brewer, Note, Disenfranchise This: State Voter ID Laws and Their
Discontents, A Blueprint for Bringing Successful Equal Protection and Poll Tax Claims, 42
VAL. U. L. REV. 191, 196 (2007) (citing the balancing test enumerated in Burdick v. Takushi,
504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992)).
57. Id. at 233.
58. Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1130-31 (7th Cir. 2004); In re Protest of Election
Returns and Absentee Ballots in the November 4, 1997 Election for the City of Miami, 707
So. 2d 1170, 1173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (“[U]nlike the right to vote ... the ability to vote
by absentee ballot is a privilege.”); Qualkinbush v. Skubisz, 826 N.E.2d 1181, 1192 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2005); see also Friedman v. Snipes, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (“[T]here
is no fundamental right to vote by absentee ballot.”).
59. See Griffin, 385 F.3d at 1130-31.
60. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
61. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432-33.
62. Erlandson v. Kiffmeyer, 659 N.W.2d 724, 733 (Minn. 2003) (citing McDonald v. Bd.
of Election Comm’rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969)).
63. McDonald, 394 U.S. at 809. Absentee and advanced voting provisions may be subject
to heightened scrutiny on state constitutional grounds if the state constitution requires that
circumstances, however, the Court has adopted a looser standard,
“balanc[ing] the ‘character and magnitude’ of the harm imposed on
the right to vote against the state’s reason for enacting the regula-
tion and the necessity of the regulation.”56 To convince a court to
apply strict scrutiny review as opposed to a more lenient rational
basis standard, the party advocating the heightened scrutiny must
effectively present the harm as severe.57
Absentee voting, however, receives unique consideration. A
number of appellate courts have concluded that the Constitution
does not confer upon citizens a right to vote absentee.58 Because the
Constitution delegates to the states the authority to regulate
election mechanisms, the states are not required to maintain an
absentee voting mechanism at all.59 The basic requirement is the
same: if the State chooses to provide for an absentee method of
voting, then it must be administered in a nondiscriminatory
manner.60 Yet as opposed to the strict scrutiny applied to provisions
regulating traditional voting, absentee voting provisions do not
receive such heightened review.61 Rather, courts apply rational basis
review to states’ absentee voting mechanisms.62
Accordingly, a court will only invalidate an absentee ballot
regulation on federal constitutional grounds if it finds that the
measure bears no “rational relationship to a legitimate state end.”63
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all citizens be afforded the right to vote in advance or absentee. See, e.g., N.H. CONST. art. XI.
64. See McDonald, 394 U.S. at 808-09.
65. Ruda, supra note 55, at 235.
66. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Absentee and Early Voting,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/elect/absentearly.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
67. Hope Andrade, Texas Secretary of State, Early Voting in Texas, http://www.sos.state.
tx.us/elections/pamphlets/earlyvote.shtml (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
68. Virginia State Board of Elections, Absentee Voting, http://www.sbe.virginia.gov/cms/
Absentee_Voting/Index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
69. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-10-1008(1) (2007); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/19-11 (2007); IND.
CODE ANN. § 3-11-10-23 (2007); IOWA CODE § 53.32 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 11-
This level of inquiry is much more deferential to the government
than strict scrutiny.64 As a result, it is more difficult to mount a
successful challenge to discriminatory absentee voting requirements
than it is to contest disenfranchisement that occurs at the polls. The
likelihood of the success of an equal protection claim under this
interpretive framework is somewhat low and is discussed in Part
II.E.
B. The Variant Standards Employed by the States
One major cause of the breakdown of the electoral process in
2000 was the lack of uniform procedural guidelines for various
aspects of the voting process.65
Because the authority over the electoral process is concentrated
at the state level, the individual states employ various methods in
administering absentee voting. Though every state provides some
manner of early voting, its structure and the qualifications that a
voter must meet in order to vote in advance differ widely among
states.66 For example, in-person early voting in Texas, which begins
seventeen days before the election, is offered to all voters who wish
to take advantage of it.67 By contrast, Virginia does not offer in-
person early voting for anyone who does not meet specific criteria,
such as absence from the district during the hours that the polls will
be open on election day.68
The states’ guidelines for validating absentee ballots are equally
diverse. Many states have explicit policies that instruct local boards
of elections to disqualify the votes of recently deceased voters who
voted absentee.69 But other states have determined that any vote
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302(d)(3)(i) (2008); MINN. STAT. § 203 B.25 (2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 115.293 (2007).
70. See Early Voting Compounds Problem of “Ghost” Votes Getting Through, USA TODAY,
Oct. 31, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/nation/2004-10-31-
dead-voters_x.htm [hereinafter Early Voting] (listing California, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, and
West Virginia as states that have specific provisions that allow the absentee votes from those
who die before the election to be counted).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000).
74. See Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1130-31 (7th Cir. 2004).
properly completed by an eligible voter should count, even if the
voter dies before election day.70 Still others do not have specific
statutory guidelines dictating how boards of elections are to treat a
deceased voter’s ballot but instead adopt unofficial “opinions” how
these votes should be treated.71 With official and unofficial state
policies regarding these ballots ranging from highly regulated to
decidedly informal, treatment of these ballots inevitably varies from
state to state.72 This type of inconsistency has the potential to lead
to voter confusion regarding why certain votes are less valuable
than others. A skeptical electorate, already dubious as to election
legitimacy and the import of its vote, may fear that the disqualifica-
tion of legally cast ballots undermines the integrity of the process
and robs some citizens of a privilege of American citizenship.
Inconsistent election policies also can foster further distrust among
voters as to the accuracy of election results when legislatures
adopt directives that are difficult to enforce uniformly. When state
practices allow election officials to validate or discredit voters’
ballots with wide latitude, the risk of haphazard administration or
abuse of discretion is heightened.
C. Equal Protection
When the state legislature vests the right to vote for President in
its people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is
fundamental; and one source of its fundamental nature lies in
the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity
owed to each voter.73
Although a voter’s right to vote absentee is far from absolute,74
once the right is extended to the electorate, it may not be infringed
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75. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-05; see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665
(1966) (“[O]nce the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are
inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
76. Early Voting, supra note 70.
77. See Beth Potier, Trust, Transparency, Democracy: Radcliffe Fellow Explains Why
Electronic Voting is Problematic, HARV. U. GAZETTE, Oct. 28, 2004, available at http://www.
news.harvard.edu/gazette/2004/10.28/09-mercuri.html.
78. Early Voting, supra note 70.
79. Id.
80. Id.
upon later in an “arbitrary and disparate” manner.75 One of the
primary problems with discrediting legally cast absentee ballots is
that the votes of similarly situated voters—those who engage in
some form of early voting—are susceptible to different treatment.
In the states where canvassers are required to disqualify votes by
the deceased, early votes submitted by mail are fairly easy to
identify and set aside, an ease of process that is not paralleled by
those tendered in person.76 This is especially true with the advent
of voting technology that separates the identity of the voter from the
content of the vote itself.77 Consider a hypothetical situation in
which 
a person in Florida casts an early ballot, then is run over by a
truck right outside the polling place, there’s no way to rescind
the vote. But the vote of a Florida soldier who mails an absentee
ballot from Iraq, then is killed in action, won’t—or shouldn’t—be
counted.78
North Carolina seeks to remedy this problem by utilizing a
system of retrievable ballots that are not counted until election day,
allowing for the removal of the ballot cast by an early voter who
dies.79 But North Carolina is highlighted as the exception rather
than the rule,80 resulting in the disparate treatment of early voters
within the states that do not have a retrievable ballot mechanism.
Even within the various voting districts, voters are subject to
dissimilar treatment though their absentee ballots are similarly
cast. In the states that do not have statutory guidelines as to the
legitimacy of ballots cast by deceased voters but rather employ
unofficial “opinions” about their merits, the ultimate decision
inevitably is left to the local election officials to determine whether
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81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“[T]he right of suffrage can be denied
by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.”).
84. See Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1132 (7th Cir. 2004).
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
86. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; McPherson v.
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 28-35 (1892)).
87. Id.
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. See generally Misha Tseytlin, Note, The United States Senate
and the Problem of Equal State Suffrage, 94 GEO. L.J. 859 (2006).
89. See FRANCES E. LEE & BRUCE I. OPPENHEIMER, SIZING UP THE SENATE: THE UNEQUAL
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these votes will count.81 Consequently, some of the votes within this
class get counted whereas others are rejected by the local election
board.82 This leads to vote dilution in the counties or precincts
where the absentee votes are counted or, conversely, increased
voting power where the votes are discarded.83 Though a state is not
held to a standard of perfection for the election mechanisms it
creates or for the success of their enforcement,84 administrative
methods that arbitrarily create this sort of disparate treatment
violate the fundamental concept of equal protection.
There is another situation, however, in which these categoriza-
tions can disadvantage voters. Specifically, United States citizens
are guaranteed the right to equal representation at the federal
level.85 Admittedly, there is “no federal constitutional right to vote
... for the President.”86 States can rescind the privilege to vote for
electors at any time, and, therefore, there is no guarantee of an
equal voice in this specific process.87 Similarly, representation in the
Senate is fundamentally unequal due to the constitutional frame-
work which commands that each state will be represented by two
members of the Senate.88 Yet the Framers of the Constitution
determined that there should be one house of Congress in which
each citizen’s interest is similarly protected, guaranteeing equal
representation within the House of Representatives.89
The Constitution provides for the representatives to be allocated
among the states “according to their respective [n]umbers,” provided
that no representative stands for fewer than 30,000 citizens, unless
a state is composed of fewer than 30,000 people, in which case it
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would have one representative.90 The Supreme Court concluded
that the House of Representatives was intended to “represent people
as individuals, and on a basis of complete equality for each voter.”91
The seats are reapportioned every ten years in order to ensure that
they are allocated evenly throughout the population.92 Currently,
the target number for each representative’s district is 646,952
residents.93 Though in reality the actual number of people that each
representative serves is slightly smaller than the target in some
states and somewhat larger than the target in others,94 the Census
Bureau redistributes the seats in the House of Representatives
every ten years in an effort to achieve the most equitable distribu-
tion feasible.95
If a certain class of voters is disenfranchised in one state but is
permitted to vote in another, then a citizen’s power over the
electoral process, in the state with a greater number of eligible
voters per elected seat, is “inevitably diluted.”96 It is simply an issue
of mathematics: the fewer voters in a district, the greater the voting
power of each individual and vice versa. Yet Article I and the
Fourteenth Amendment, considered in concert, require that each
voter has relatively the same amount of power in choosing his
representative,97 and, furthermore, that a state may not promote an
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imbalance in this representation arbitrarily.98 Permitting these
absentee and advance voting ballots to count in some states but not
in others shifts this important balance.
When evaluating the equal protection implications of discrediting
legally cast ballots of voters who die before the election, it is
essential to identify when the right to vote originated. It is not a
question of whether the deceased should be able to vote but whether
a person’s vote should be treated and weighted equally once the
right to vote is exercised. There is nothing in the Constitution or
elsewhere in federal law that defines the right to vote solely in
terms of a person living through 12:01 a.m. “on the Tuesday next
after the first Monday in November.”99 Rather, a more logical con-
clusion would use the state’s actions to define when the right is
generated, concluding that the right to vote absentee comes into
existence once the state offers it to qualified electors and the
prescribed election period begins.100 Because the voter is given the
legal opportunity to take advantage of this enfranchisement and he
exercises this right before his death,101 this Note argues that his
vote should be afforded equal import.
D. Can Dead Voters Have Equal Protection Rights?
Every cause of action whether legal or equitable ... shall survive
either the death of the person against whom the cause of action
is or may be asserted, or the death of the person in whose favor
the cause of action existed, or the death of both such persons.102
When discussing the equal protection issues surrounding this
class of voters, it is natural to question whether voters who die
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before the election can even have equal protection rights.103 This
is an important area in the debate surrounding these votes, and
one should consider arguments of mootness. Areas of the law other
than those dealing with election administration and disputes are
instructive when evaluating whether an equal protection claim on
behalf of the deceased voter is tenable.
1. Analysis by Analogy: Wrongful Death, Civil Rights, and
Privilege
There are a variety of circumstances in which the law recognizes
civil liability on behalf of a decedent. The classic example in tort law
is wrongful death.104 This type of tort is the law’s recognition that,
absent a mechanism for a party—other than the one who was
directly injured—to bring suit, there will be some cases in which a
tortfeasor will not bear the burden of liability.105 Accordingly, state
laws provide the survivors of the deceased with a mechanism for
bringing a claim against the wrongdoer.106
These types of survivorship actions also extend to civil rights
cases. Congress has expressly provided that civil rights infringe-
ments are actionable for civil liability.107 In determining whether
survivors of a deceased may bring suit for these violations, however,
the federal government defers to state survivorship statutes to
define who, if anyone, can initiate a cause of action.108 When a state
provides for a cause of action on the decedent’s behalf109 and federal
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law does not preempt such a provision,110 these civil actions are
upheld in federal court.111
Privilege is another area in which the law recognizes the
continued rights of the deceased. For each of the three main clas-
sifications of privileged communications—attorney-client, doctor-
patient, and marital—courts have upheld the privacy protections of
privilege even after one, or both, of the parties has died. In the
realm of attorney-client privilege, the Supreme Court erected a
nearly impenetrable bulwark around these confidential conversa-
tions.112 The Court allows only a limited exception for “litigation
between the testator’s heirs” as to the decedent’s intentions re-
garding the disbursement of his estate.113 This strong privilege
defense reflects the Court’s reasoning that a person may be
hindered from full disclosure should the protection be extinguished
upon death, thereby undermining the primary purpose of the
privilege defense.114
This posthumous privilege defense is not exclusive to attorney-
client privilege. Courts also have upheld state evidentiary rules
protecting the doctor-patient privilege of a deceased patient, rea-
soning similarly that “[t]he purpose of the laws would be thwarted,
and the policy intended to be promoted thereby would be defeated,
if death removed the seal of secrecy from the communications and
disclosures which a patient should make to his physician.”115
Likewise, marital privilege continues even after the death of a
spouse.116 Marital conversations are presumptively confidential
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unless affirmative evidence demonstrates the parties did not intend
for the exchange to be private.117
These examples illustrate the law’s respect for the rights of a
decedent and the importance of legal liability even after the injured
party dies to encourage potential tortfeasors to take greater care
before a cause of action arises.118 The reinforcement of privilege also
indicates a policy decision by the courts that the functionality and
integrity of the legal system is best served by strengthening rather
than abating the protection provided to these types of communica-
tions.119 To promote certainty and to further the goals contemplated
by the privilege shield, these safeguards are enforced even after a
person’s death.120
A number of the same considerations are at work within the
voting context. Were a decedent’s survivors unable to bring an
action on his behalf when his vote is unfairly rejected, there would
never be a legal framework through which discriminatory legisla-
tion of this kind could be challenged. No party would ever have
standing to sue, and a constitutional challenge would not have the
chance to advance to a judgment on the merits.121
Furthermore, although the policy concerns at work in the priv-
ilege context protect against the undesirable revelation of informa-
tion after death, the greater implications of the privilege framework
are applicable to the enfranchisement of deceased voters. Privilege
guarantees a posthumous protection for protected communications
to encourage people to obtain legal service, seek medical care, and
develop a candid marriage. Likewise, continued defense of the legal
exercise of citizens’ voting privilege promotes the effective utiliza-
tion of that privilege. In both circumstances, the legal recognition of
these rights, even after the death of the one by whom it was exer-
cised, is meant to advance the employment of these rights before
death.
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Finally, the law’s treatment of privilege—that a privilege is not
subject to a new definition simply because of the death of one of the
parties—indicates deference to legal certainty which is similarly
applicable to the electoral system. Just as a person who exercises a
privilege before death should not have its protections stripped away
after death, neither should a voter who exercises the legal right to
vote have his ballot robbed of its political significance upon his
death. Instead of choosing to count or discard votes based on
whether the voter is still alive at a certain time on a certain day, a
system that counts all votes cast during a legal election period
recognizes that the strength and stability of the American electoral
process rests on its esteem for each person’s vote and the certitude
that each appropriately tendered vote will be counted.
2. Effect on Surviving Voters
Another class of voters whose equal protection rights are affected
includes the voters in precincts that count the ballots of deceased
voters. The Supreme Court has recognized vote dilution in a variety
of contexts, observing that “[a] citizen’s right to a vote ... has been
judicially recognized as a right secured by the Constitution, when
such impairment resulted from dilution by a false tally, or by a
refusal to count votes from arbitrarily selected precincts, or by a
stuffing of the ballot box.”122 Accordingly, a member of the electorate
whose voting power is weakened because of the arbitrary counting
of votes in some districts and discrediting of votes in others is able
to state “a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the
effectiveness of [his] votes.”123 This dilutive effect qualifies the voter
to bring an equal protection claim.124
E. The Likelihood of Success (or Failure) on the Merits
Even if a plaintiff overcomes standing, the likelihood of success
on the merits of an equal protection claim is still very low. Because
rules regarding absentee voting are evaluated under the rational
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basis test,125 wide latitude would be given to the states in defending
their vote-counting guidelines. There are a number of justifications
a state could advance, such as a legislative belief that the adminis-
trative convenience derived from a certain policy would make an
equitable result more achievable.126 The mechanisms adopted by the
states in managing absentee voting do not have to be perfect but
rather reasonably fair.127 As long as the court finds the states’
explanations to be rational, the statute would not be invalidated.
Accordingly, though the absentee policies in some states certainly
treat some votes differently than others, equal protection argu-
ments, standing alone, are somewhat tenuous. A further motivation
is needed to compel federal intervention in the debate over these
types of ballots. That interest—the necessity of voter faith in the
electoral system—is considered in Part III.
III. NECESSITY OF VOTERS’ FAITH IN THE SYSTEM
Legitimacy requires that governments conduct elections in a
way that is objectively fair and widely perceived as fair.
Therefore, a central motivation for nonpartisan and uniform
system of election administration is “that every citizen, every
voter, be treated equally and have an equal opportunity to
participate.”128
Regardless of the success or failure of an equal protection remedy
at law, another argument supporting the adoption of a uniform
national standard regulating the consideration of absentee ballots
persists. Namely, the Supreme Court recognized a “sufficiently im-
portant interest”129 in “the preservation of public faith in democratic
2010] THE VOTE FROM BEYOND THE GRAVE 1603
130. Andrew N. DeLaney, Note, Appearance Matters: Why the State Has an Interest in
Preventing the Appearance of Voting Fraud, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 847, 862 (2008); see also
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1617 (2008).
131. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1976).
132. Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2770-72 (2008).
133. See Hayward D. Reynolds, Deconstructing State Action: The Politics of State Action,
20 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 847, 884 (1994). Because absentee voting is neither constitutionally
required nor constitutionally proscribed, see supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text,
congressional intervention in this area of weakly established rights should be upheld if the
government can articulate a sufficient interest for its actions.
134. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
135. Ruda, supra note 55, at 249 (citing 148 CONG. REC. S1226, S1229 (daily ed. Feb. 27,
2002)(statement of Sen. Bond)); see also Steven F. Huefner, Remedying Election Wrongs, 44
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 265, 288-90 (2007) (addressing the need for voters to have faith in reme-
dial measures undertaken after a “failed” election).
136. DAVID B. MUHLHAUSEN & KERI WEBER SIKICH, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION: LEGAL
ISSUES, NEW ANALYSIS SHOWS VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS DO NOT REDUCE TURNOUT 3
(2007), http://www.heritage.org/research/LegalIssues/cda07-04.cfm.
government.”130 This interest was articulated in the context of
individual campaign contribution limitations,131 an area that
receives heightened scrutiny because of its implication of the right
to freedom of speech.132 If this justification could be accepted as a
legitimate restriction on First Amendment rights—one of the most
sacrosanct areas of constitutional protection—then congressional
action regarding the counting of absentee ballots seems certain to
survive judicial scrutiny, even if it slightly encroaches on a field in
which the states have generally exercised primary control.133
The interest in “the prevention of corruption and the appearance
of corruption”134 is significant enough to urge congressional action,
though such action may be unpopular. If citizens do not have
confidence in the voting system, then discriminatory policies not
only undermine its integrity but actually impair the voting process
because people are less likely to exercise their voting rights.135 Some
refer to the “Calculus of Voting” model which reasons that a voter
takes the time to exercise the franchise if there are positive rewards
to be gained from doing so.136 According to this formula, the rewards
are calculated:
by multiplying the benefits (B) an individual receives when his
preferred candidate wins over a less preferred candidate by the
probability (P) that his vote will make a difference plus the
benefits one receives from voting as an act of fulfilling one’s duty
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or civic obligation (D) minus the costs of voting (C) [R = PB – C
+ D].137
Thus, a voter’s perception that his ballot will make a difference—or
at least has the possibility of making a difference—positively
influences his tendency to vote.138 A sampling of statistical informa-
tion supports the assertion that the electorate’s belief in the
integrity of the voting system increases voter turnout.139
Some scholars assert that the incidence of deceased voting is
low.140 But when an election comes down to just hundreds of votes,
every vote counts.141 Therefore, regardless of whether a party lacks
standing to bring an equal protection challenge to the constitution-
ality of certain voting laws, faith in the voting system is a sufficient
concern meriting action by the federal government when remaining
inactive would undermine the system’s integrity. Though evidence
that this functional disparity actually causes voters not to vote is
limited, the inference drawn from available information is clear:
people are more likely to exercise the right to vote when they believe
their voice will have an impact.142 The true story of a dying woman
deliberately filling out her absentee ballot as her last conscious act
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can lead to no other conclusion than that she would be less likely to
vote if she knew that her vote would be arbitrarily excluded.143
Coupled with a class of citizens that simply does not see the point
in voting when an election is decided by the courts rather than the
people,144 the principles that are employed by many of the states
serve to discourage rather than encourage participation in the
process. A government statute protecting all legally cast votes would
help to dispel the distrust that many voters currently have in
electoral administration and potentially aid in the effort to “get out
the vote.”
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Elections are fundamentally imperfect ... no matter how many
positive reforms we enact, there will always be a few incredibly
close elections that lie “within the margin of litigation.”145
To protect the civil liberties of those who exercise their right to
vote and to promote certainty in the electoral system, Congress
should legislate in this area. Equal protection requires that the law,
to the extent it is capable, reject election mechanisms that would
value one citizen’s vote over another. There are two possible ways
that Congress could approach ballots cast by voters who die before
election day: (1) disqualifying all such ballots, or (2) counting such
ballots as long as each vote was lawfully executed during a legal
election period. Either approach should be capable of withstanding
a court’s rational basis review in light of the federal interest in
maintaining the equality and integrity of the election process
through reasonable mechanisms. The latter option, however, pro-
duces results that are more equitable than the former.
Ballot counting is inherently prone to human error, and techno-
logical advances do not automatically solve the problem. Identifying
fraudulent ballots, such as those cast in the name of a person who
died many years before, is an extremely time-consuming and
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difficult task. Added to that difficulty are the demands for a quick
turnaround in calculating and certifying the results. Ultimately,
local election boards, many of which are chronically understaffed
and short on resources,146 could better expend their energies by
focusing on detecting election fraud rather than poring over the
obituaries147 in order to disqualify legitimate absentee ballots.
Counting all ballots cast in a legal election period not only would
more realistically meet the goal of equal treatment of the electorate
but also would promote faith in voter enfranchisement. It would
signify the government’s recognition that the right to vote is
revered, and it would dispel people’s fears that their vote might be
discredited on bad information or misidentification.148 Furthermore,
it would encourage the electorate to exercise this right to vote.
Elderly and terminally ill voters will continue to demand their right
to representation if they believe that their vote will be counted along
with the others.149 There will be greater, though still imperfect, trust
in the validity of a vote legally cast by a citizen who is entitled to do
so and an improved faith in the process that brought their leaders
to Washington.
Although state authority and principles of federalism should be
given due deference, the most effective means of establishing a fair
and straightforward national standard is through congressional
intervention. Because HAVA is tied to congressional spending,
Congress has broad authority to require the states to adopt certain
standards as a condition for receiving federal funds, further
insulating such legislation from invalidation as an encroachment
upon states’ rights.150 This bill should provide that all absentee or
advance ballots cast during an authorized election period shall be
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counted, provided there is no reason to suspect fraudulent or illegal
activity.
Congress is not obligated, however, to attach this regulation to
spending. The legislature has the constitutional authority to
regulate elections, enabling Congress to adopt a statutory provision
requiring the uniform treatment of votes in these situations.151 A
third approach—adopting a congressional resolution—might best
navigate the often rocky relationship between the federal and state
governments. As a nonbinding action, a congressional resolution
would encourage the states to adopt this standard of presumed
legitimacy for themselves. Rather than mandating the way that
states view ballots cast by voters who die before election day,
Congress would simply recommend that the states move in the same
direction. Though often utilized when Congress wants to promote a
uniform national policy in an area in which it has no lawmaking
authority,152 the practical result of such a resolution is minimal
since compliance with congressional urging is unenforceable.
Though Congress could legislate outside of the HAVA spending
mechanism or could choose to exercise a nonconfrontational ap-
proach through simply drafting a resolution, an amendment to
HAVA or some other piece of legislation that attaches federal
regulation to federal spending strikes the appropriate balance
between deference for states’ rights and voters’ rights. Further, it
will afford three primary benefits to the voting franchise: (1) it will
define a uniform approach of presumed legitimacy to absentee and
advance ballots, (2) it will eliminate the time-consuming and dif-
ficult task of attempting to identify and isolate ballots of those who
have passed away, and (3) it will preserve the voice of every citizen
who takes the time to participate in her government.
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CONCLUSION
There are a variety of pressing concerns that Americans have
regarding the electoral system. Although remedying one of these
problems will not dispel all of the uneasiness surrounding election
administration, it will be a positive step signifying the government’s
commitment to providing fair and accurate elections. The increase
in absentee and early voting suggests that congressional action
would be useful in defending the value of each vote.
In an effort to weigh state supervisory power over elections
against the rights of qualified voters, Congress must determine
which issues it will address and which it will leave to individual
state legislatures. Because a policy protecting absentee and advance
ballots cast by voters who die before the election renovates the law
with a paintbrush rather than a bulldozer, it is a prime area for
federal legislation as an important yet conservative first step. Yet
even if Congress declines to exercise its authority in this area, each
state should evaluate its philosophy about absentee voters’ rights to
ensure that when a citizen uses her voice it will not be silenced.
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